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Este trabajo estudia los dos mayores conflictos checheno-rusos desde 1991 hasta 2009 en relación a 
las transformaciones identitarias discursivas de los chechenos quienes pasaron de ser denominados 
“luchadores por la libertad” a “terroristas” en menos de una década. Esto es realizado mediante un 
análisis de discurso de acuerdo con el post-estructuralismo en Relaciones Internacionales, por ende, 
enfocándose no solo en lo explícitamente dicho, sino en el contexto y la legitimidad involucradas en 
las relaciones de poder existentes. Debido al relativo desconocimiento sobre estos conflictos, el 
trabajo se estructura para describir por separado las dos instancias más importantes de los conflictos 
para posteriormente señalar los contrastes y similitudes entre ambos. Los conflictos son también 
contextualizados con los eventos mundiales relevantes, especialmente su relación al 9/11 y la Guerra 
contra el Terrorismo debido a que la fe musulmana de los chechenos fue crucial para las 
transformaciones identitarias observadas. Los propósitos de esta obra son mostrar cuán susceptible y 
poderoso es el discurso actualmente y cómo este interactúa con las estructuras actuales de 
organizaciones internacionales y los medios de comunicación. Adicionalmente, busca llamar 
atención a un conflicto que, si bien ha amainado, está todavía presente, pero es ignorado por la 
mayoría. Finalmente, busca mostrar cómo la comprensión del lenguaje y el discurso puede prevenir 
la manipulación política.  
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This paper studies the two major Chechen-Russian conflicts from 1991 to 2009 in relation to the 
discursive identity transformations of the Chechens who went from being denominated “freedom 
fighters” to “terrorists” in less than a decade. This is done through post-structuralist discourse analysis 
in International Relations, hence focusing not only on what was explicitly said, but also the context 
and legitimacy involved in the existing relations of power. Because of the relatively unknown nature 
of these conflicts, the paper is structured to describe both major instances of conflicts separately and 
then, draws the contrasts and similarities between them. The conflicts are also contextualized within 
major happenings of the world, especially their relation to 9/11 and the War on Terror because the 
Chechen’s Muslim faith was crucial in the identity transformation observed. The aims of this work 
are to show how susceptible and powerful discourse is nowadays and how it interacts with the current 
structures of international organizations and the media. Additionally, it seeks to call attention to a 
conflict which, while subdued, is still present but largely ignored by most. Finally, it strives to show 
how understanding language and discourse could prevent political manipulation.  
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Every generation experiences certain events whose magnitude is so significant that they 
may change history. Whether it is war, revolutionary technology or incredible scientific discoveries, 
they become the center topic of discourse production of an era. In the case of the 90s, the end of the 
Cold War following the fall of the Berlin Wall characterized an optimistic and revolutionary decade 
upon which a new world order was speculated. The early 2000s had a different defining event: the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 on the Twin Towers in New York. This event captured worldwide 
attention, as the United States declared a War on Terror with the support of most states which 
considered a new threat coming from non-state actors. However, little is known about the previous 
existence of a similar terrorism narrative that had taken place on the other side of the globe and in 
which the United States had been involved, yet not in support of the denouncing State. This is the 
case of the Russian Federation and relatively recent sovereignty-related conflicts over the territory 
of Chechnya.  
This paper analyzes a conflict that thrived in the 90s but was relegated to the media’s 
backburner as the new millennium came to wage its War on Terror. This is the case of the First and 
Second Chechen-Russian Wars in 1994-1996 and 1999-2009 respectively. Because these conflicts 
were based on a territorial dispute in a single state’s territory, one could argue that domestic affairs 
were not of global interest. However, that was not the case. As the end of the Cold War involved 
the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, the 90s attention was set on these newly 
independent and changing territories. Under that light, the independentist efforts on part of the 
Chechens were seen with empathy by most of the Western powers much to the frustration of the 
Russian state. It is then intriguing how, less than 5 years after the end of the conflict and during the 
second confrontation, the tides changed to favor the Russians. The author of this paper believes 




the former was enclosed in narratives of optimism and globalization, the latter suffered from the 
spillover of a pervasive narrative of terrorism and radicalization that portrayed them as a threat to 
the status quo of a State-centered world order.  
This proposal will study the subject through a post-structuralist lens, utilizing discourse 
analysis to study how the different narratives affected the perceptions and identities of the parties of 
the conflicts. In order to do so, the key concepts of power relations as shaped by discourse will 
precede the presentation of historical descriptions of both conflicts. While the focus will be on the 
description of the happenings in the war themselves, these will be accompanied by brief 
descriptions of important events on a global scale, as they had the relevance to influence the 
discourses and dynamics of the conflicts. Then, once it is clear how the events happened, 
comparisons will be drawn between the two conflicts and the discourses present in both 
circumstances in order to assess similarities and differences that may contribute to explain the 








The present paper relies on discourse analysis by the poststructuralist tradition in 
international relations striving to question the different identity transformations that will be 
described. As such, it pays careful attention to language considering it “a social system with its own 
relational logic, [which] produces reality for humans” (Neumann 2009, 61). From language, 
individuals interact and create representations by which they try to understand the world while 
simultaneously shaping it through their own productions. These individual representations grouped 
together allow the abstraction and interpretation of power relations as they exist and act as 
anchoring points for the strategies of power itself (Foucault 1987, 121). Those linguistic 
productions are then dynamically reproduced and modified by society through the interactions of 
the actors (Neumann 2009, 60-61), as they partake in dialectic processes in which actors share and 
modify discourse through their own agency thus shaping social structures because of the actors’ 
behavioral changes or lack thereof (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 6). It is then, through the set of 
different social productions, actions, and representations that power relations are created and give 
rise to social and political interactions (Campbell 2013, 235). Thus, discourse will not be only 
understood as the spoken or written word but rather as a narrative (Kubiak 2004, 295) and will be 
analyzed within the historical setting that shaped them and was thus shaped by them aware that 
while history might try to be all-encompassing, it is also unavoidably nuanced (Foucault 2000, 55-
61).  
Following the aforementioned processes, normalization takes place and usually binds some 
identities to particular discourses by the means of metaphors that create an antagonistic narrative 
between actors with the goal of institutionalizing that discourse (Neumann 2009, 61). While 
institutionalization usually conveys the idea of conventional forms of power such as law, the 
concept of power will be treated as practically omnipresent in the social sphere as it exists in and is 




(Foucault 1980, 141-142). Because of this, key considerations for the analysis are immanence, 
continuous variation, double conditioning and especially the principle of tactical polyvalence of 
discourses and its relation with silences.  
On the previous observation, it is important to point out that neither discourse nor silence 
submit to power or antagonize it, rather they shape it and transfer it as well as limit and expand it 
(Foucault 1987, 123). Discourses and silences are constitutive elements of power and thus they 
should be understood as precursors of action (Neumann 2009, 62). By this reasoning, the paper 
explores the way in which the constructed identity of the Chechens experienced transformations 
through the official Russian discourses, and those of foreign powers. As the principal actors of 
interest, one observes the management of both strategic and communicative uses of language by 
both Russians and Chechens, noting that frequently the lack of a common ground of meaning 
interferes with mutual understanding (Fierke 2002, 348). In addition to sharing conceptual common 
ground, the legitimacy of a discourse depends on the ethos of the speaker—their trustworthiness 
and knowledgeability on the topics (Tedford 1990, 6). Particular attention is given to Russian 
discourses because of the consideration of legitimacy that a state commonly holds as well as its 
interactions with the silences into which minorities or rebels, in this case referred to as terrorists, are 
commonly confined as they follow certain “rules” described by Fierke (2002):  
A "game" involving a global coalition of states and terrorists relies on a different structure of 
rules than a balance of power. Given the multiplicity of language games, the patterns evident 
in human behavior cannot be captured in propositions that mirror the logical structure of the 
world throughout time. They are rules that govern how we reason and interact with others in 
different contexts of social or international life. These rules are a basis for attributing meaning 
to both the material world and social interactions within it. (…) The pattern governing 
interactions with "rogue states" or "terrorists" differs from that of interacting with recognized 
states. (…) [The Cold War] provided a framework for attributing meaning to any number of 
other conflicts, from ethnic wars to terrorism to economic transactions. (338) 
 
On that note, when approaching the notions of the legitimacy of discourse, it is crucial to 
understand that the author does not question or strives to validate or not the Chechen identity of 




moments in time is what will be analyzed both through academic sources such as journals and news 
articles in order to try and balance the subjectivity of history in retrospect. As Foucault noted, 
resistance is not external to power but exists within and because of it as targets for its 
implementation, as antagonists or even as scapegoats for the exercise of power (1987, 116-117). 
While this analysis will focus on the Chechen-Russian conflicts specifically, by no means it tries to 
portray the Chechens as a sole or key embodiment of resistance to the Russian power. Resistance 
entails a multiplicity of actors and productions which form a web throughout the power discourse 
and -if numerous enough- may be responsible for the orchestration of a revolution (Foucault 1987, 
117 - 118). The subject of this paper is set on this population because of the significance that it had, 
acknowledging that its resisting character interacted with other forms of resistance by Russians 
themselves, the media or by both states and non-state actors. Nevertheless, one needs to be aware 
that the Chechens were by no means a monolithic entity because of their own kind of organization, 
mostly under various competing warlords (Russell 2005, 107). Hence, while they could appear and 
act as a united front against a common enemy during war times, the different leaders of the 
Chechen factions had their own political, economic and even religious ends to pursue which were, 
most often than not, incompatible with those of other Chechens (Walsh 2006, The Guardian 2010).  
Now, it is following the notions of power and discourses that some discourses of interests 
will be explained: globalization and terrorism. For one, globalization as discourse is here 
understood particularly in the context of a post-Cold War world, especially on the repercussions of 
it creating a “new world” (Selchow 2017, 90). This specific understanding of the discourse is 
behind this paper’s consideration of the reactions and contributions of international actors in a 
relatively domestic issue as a secessionist/independentist conflict can be. Considering that the wars 
in question are strongly related to the Soviet Union’s break down and the independence of several 
territories, this narrative on globalization is deemed adequate for analysis. Taking on Foucault’s 




globalization discourse that will be herewith used follows Selchow’s proposal of it “as a moment in 
the re-production of a web of meanings that brings out an ‘object’, which I call ‘new world’” (2017, 
95). This “new world” begins to exist in the post- Cold War period as it constituted the end of a 
decades-long international narrative centered on a bipolar balance of power and thus left a 
conceptual vacuum (Selchow 2017, 91), which was attempted to be filled with new paradigms such 
as Huntington’s “Clash of civilizations” or Fukuyama’s “End of history”.  
The aforementioned conceptual vacuum allowed for other discourses to be questioned and 
became a fruitful time for new discourses to arise while old ones renewed themselves, such as the 
centuries-lost Chechen autonomy one which strived to become a modern-day state rather than 
return to their previous existence as a clan. The rising new power dynamics called for a different 
global strategy (Foucault 1980, 142) which would be that of globalization-discourse and its power 
to create and shape a “new world”. Now, since power was reshaping itself within the new strategy, 
so was the resistance within that power and that is part of how the terrorist narrative became 
relevant in post-Cold War Russia as will be explained below.  
The terrorist narrative is not new; however, it could be seen as a particularly contemporary 
discourse because of its marked presence in everyday life after the events of September 11, 2001 
(Kubiak 2004, 296). Operative definitions of terrorism as a phenomenon can be traced back to 1930 
when it was understood as “the method (or the theory behind the method) whereby an organized 
group or party sought to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence” 
(Laqueur 1977, 3). This kind of definition allowed it to be distinguished from governmental action 
and political stances as well as mass uprisings or other forms of organized violence. As a discourse, 
terrorism is commonly paired with notions of rebellion and protest and with a negative 
interpretation because of illegitimate use of violence against what is considered the status quo 




of righting -usually historical- wrongs (Laqueur 1977, 9-13), even if that understanding has been 
cast aside in the most recent manifestation of this narrative due to the War on Terror after 9/11.  
An additional consideration in the Chechen case is that of their status as a different ethnic 
group and a minority -regardless of being the largest one of the Caucasus (Russell 2005, 103). This 
condition also influences the narratives about them both domestically and internationally. For one, 
they are relegated to a generalized non-identity (JanMohamed and Lloyd 1987, 16) as non-Russian. 
Simultaneously, they are subjected to condescending and victimizing discourses (Radhakrishnan 
2006, 44) that can be counterproductive to assertive and revendicating actions on their part 
(JanMohamed and Lloyd 1987, 7-8). JanMohamed and Lloyd (1987) refer to non-identities as ones 
created by those in power as they acknowledge the subdued (minorities) as “others” who exist 
within their society but do not belong to it while simultaneously ignoring and, on occasion, 
undermining their form of self-identification (16). In this case, it goes back to the Russian empire 
and the Chechens’ reluctance to be a part of it, and even worse, to accept to be referred as 
“Russians” but facing the struggle of not being allowed to identify as Chechens (Souleimanov and 
Ditrych 2008, 1209). The dynamics of negative-based identities remained until the 90’s as the 
Chechen people suffered from deportations, forced exile and even “indirect” genocide during the 
Soviet order, especially under Stalin’s rule (Russell 2005, 103-104). Additionally, during the 90’s 
plenty of the international discourses that surrounded their struggles tended to victimize them 
(Doukaev 2014), which served their cause to gain empathy and support, but did little to change their 
situation. Both victimization and negative identities are witnessed throughout the conflicts, yet the 







First Chechen-Russian War: 1994 -1996 
The Conflict 
The historical overview needs to start before the war officially began in 1994 in order to 
understand how it came to be. As a general observation, it should be noted that Chechen-Russian 
relations and the resulting conflict are centuries old, with confrontations dating back to the 19th 
century and the expansion of the Russian empire under the Romanovs (Menon and Fuller 2000, 
33). Taking into consideration the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chechen territory 
-or province- held elections that were won by General Dzhokar Dudayev who promptly unilaterally 
declared Chechnya as an independent state from the Russian Federation (Souleimanov and Ditrych 
2008, 1209). However, little attention was given to these claims by the then-president, Boris 
Yeltsin. He approached the issue by allowing certain liberties and concessions to the religious 
organization in the Chechen territory even if he passed economic restrictions and sanctions up to the 
point where he declared a state of emergency in the region (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2008, 1209).  
Most notably, Yelstin recognized Islam as a “traditional religion” allowing for the 
construction of mosques and public practice of Islamic customs which had been previously 
prohibited, giving way to a Muslim resurgence of sorts (Dannreuther 2010, 212). However, on the 
political aspect, Chechens exercised a de facto independence in their laws and procedures for while 
the religious concerns were recognized and taken advantage of, it was conceived as a disguise of 
sorts for their national struggle according to Dudayev’s statements such as: “I would like the 
Chechen Republic to be an institutional secular state” (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2008, 1209). The 
increasingly more daring actions and liberties that had been taken by the Chechens eventually met 
several military exercises and attacks from the Russian forces in 1993 (Gass 1997, 983). After 
these, Dudayev declared war on Russia in September 1994 which led to a Russian invasion meant 
to eradicate the independentist movement in November of that same year (Gass 1997, 983). As this 




civilians, almost one-fifth of the Chechen population, it encapsulated the Chechen identity as that of 
“freedom fighters” as far as the worldwide media was concerned (Mirovalev 2014).  
 
The Discourses 
Nevertheless, while the Russian government tried to legitimize the repression and actions 
against the Chechens because of their secessionist actions, the Islamic radicalization discourse was 
not used by the state during Yeltsin’s period (Dannreuther 2010, 112). On the contrary, religious 
discourses of radicalization were used by the Chechens against one another, exemplified by this 
account of a warlord’s mercenary: “We're too busy fighting amongst ourselves to care about the 
militants” (The Guardian, 2006). To understand this claim, one notes that because of the exile and 
the existence of different branches of Islam, once Yeltsin allowed for Islam to reflourish in 
Chechnya, the different representatives frequently blamed and accused one another of being 
“radical” and “dangerous” (113). This happened as political and religious leaders accused one 
another of spreading fake faith because while some defended a Russian-Islam, others accused them 
of being jihadist and “Wahhabis”, being the true anti-Russian faction (Dannreuther 2010, 113). 
Because of this internal instability and competitiveness, radical Islamic discourse could be seen as 
one of the debilitating and internally destabilizing factors that came from the Chechens and was 
later on used by the Russian government.  
In contrast, the Russian government expressed a rather different source of worry: the 
potential spread of ideas of independence and uprising by their neighboring Caucasian peoples such 
as the Karachai, the Tartars, the Ossetians and the Lezgins (Gass 1997, 983). In addition to the very 
worrying prospect of losing even more territories after the collapse of the USSR, these territories 
held strong value for the Russian Federation because of their richness in natural resources, namely 
oil (Mirovalev 2014). All in all, some would argue that the Russian concerns were more in line with 




Caucasus in the early and mid-90s were approached as being ethnonational rather than religious 
(Dannreuther 2010, 114). This was because the possibility of the different peoples of the Caucasus 
bonding over Islam’s sacred war was rather unconceivable but collaborating or simultaneously 
engaging in uprisings against the Russian State for their own quests for independence was a risk 
that the Russian authorities could not afford.  
However, it should be noted that under post-structuralism both denominations would not be 
mutually exclusive and could easily coexist and/or complement one another, as each party 
interpreted their own reasons for engaging in war. The usage of each, can prove fascinating as the 
ethnonational denomination served Russia to avoid certain responsibility on the conflict and blame 
violence on competing Caucasian clans (Dannreuther 2010, 119) but also exposed it during the 
First Chechen war to a discourse of an oppressing state against a minority (Doukaev 2014). Putin 
tried to avoid international censure before 9/11 by strategically professing multi-national policies 
such as declaring November 4th “National Unity Day” to celebrate Muslim minorities (Dannreuther 
2010, 120). However, after 9/11 Putin made sure to stress that radical Islamist terrorists were the 
problem as by 2004, he declared the Caucasus as “rich soil for extremist propaganda” (in Snetkov 
2007, 1357) and it was his duty to defend Russia’s statehood.  
Now, the First Chechen-Russian War is considered to be brief because of its duration of 20 
months (BBC News 2018). As the Russian troops had invaded Chechen territory, most of the 
damages and human loss affected the Chechens. However, for context, it needs to be addressed that 
even if the Chechens had lived a couple of years following a state’s structure, Chechnya had 
historically been a land of warlords, mafias, and guerrillas (Russell 2005, 105). Such was the case 
that the traditional Russian image of the Chechens during the 19th century used to be that of a “lone 
outlaw” or “noble bandit” under the word abrek (Russel 2005, 103). However, after the forced exile 
under Stalin’s rule and the eventual recolonization of their land, the 20th century witnessed a 




thieves (wor), especially as Chechen mafia crimes became known because of their unmatched 
violence and brutality (Russell 2005, 104-105). With that track record, it was hard to justify plenty 
of the Chechen’s actions, and yet, the world did and compared the Chechen-Russian conflict as a 
new manifestation of the tale of David against Goliath (Russell 2005, 107).  
 
Hostage Situations 
On that line, the events that truly captured the attention of the world and could have risked 
losing the international support for the rebels were several hostage crises, especially those in 
Budyonnovsk in June 1995 and Kizlyar in January 1996. Before delving into the situations, the 
numbers of both perpetrators and victims are approximations since no real evidence of the figures 
was found. After Russian troops had seized Grozny -the Chechen capital- in February 1995, the 
conflict spread out from the capital (Gass 1997, 894). In an effort to fulfill the threats to spread the 
war to other territories, several Chechen rebels led by Shamil Basayev went to a hospital in the 
Russian city of Budyonnovsk to do so (Specter 1995). There a group of approximately 100 
Chechens took hostages (presumed to be as many as 1,000) of which a hundred were killed both by 
the rebels as well as by the Russian forces during the rescue operation (BBC News, 2004). Before 
that rather Pyrrhic victory, the Chechens had expressed the following demands: “that Russian 
troops withdraw immediately from Chechnya, that President Boris N. Yeltsin beg[a]n talks with 
General Dudayev and that the rebels be permitted to meet with reporters” (Specter 1995). While the 
second demand was met and eventually failed as dialogues were abandoned, the first demand was 
blatantly ignored and the third was partially conceded. No such “luck” would accompany the 
Kizlyar crisis.  
While the aforementioned attack had been publicly denounced by President Dudayev as 
“such attacks can only discredit the Chechen people” (quoted in Specter 1995), the next hostage 




200 Chechen militants, received no such chiding (BBC News, 2004). Because their demands for 
Russian troops to abandon Chechen territory had not been heeded, the same violent methods were 
applied. However, after Budyonnovsk a heavier oath hung in the air during negotiations as 
President Dudayev’s had vowed to ensure that Russia would “burn in hell” (Specter 1995). And 
burn they did. As the Russian forces acquiesced to the demand of letting the rebels get back to the 
Chechen territory, most hostages were freed even if some had already been executed -or at least 
pretended to- and some others served as shields and guarantees for the rebels’ safe travel (BBC 
News 2004). Another unsuccessful rescue mission failed and took the lives of around 60 hostages, 
more than 100 Chechen rebels and some 160 hostages used as human shields to assure safe passage 
(Barber 1996). The losses for each side could be debatable because plenty of the rebels in both 
hostage situations wore a very particular item to negotiations, green ribbons that identified them as 
self-declared suicide warriors (Specter 1995) which would probably modified their own perception 
of “losses” as far as human lives were concerned.  
The usage of the green ribbons accounts for another aspect of this conflict, that while the 
Russian State-enforced tactics meant to invade and overpower other armies, their opponents had 
engaged in a guerrilla war with a deadly twist (Menon and Fuller 2000, 41-42; Mirovalev 2014). 
Because of the guerilla tactics, rarely did the Chechens actually confronted the Russians as a single 
or coordinated front (Trenin 2000). Several Chechen groupings would seize control of strategic 
locations, often secluded, rural areas from where they would operate to sabotage Russian bases and 
equipment, stage ambushes and would often recruit along the way (Trenin 2000). The suicide 
warriors identified themselves to know who accepted to be left behind from an attack, or who 
would participate in highly risky operations (Trenin 2000), or as in the described case, who would 
participate in negotiations under the risk of being imprisoned or ambushed. On that note, some 
speculated that under circumstances when capture was inevitable, it was also meant to be a 




(freedom or death!)” (Gasperini 1995), but that was never confirmed nor denied. Notoriously, this 
suicidal approach to confrontations was what made their usage of guerrilla techniques more 
aggressive and lethal than the standard. However, they should not be confused with suicide 
bombers, who appeared in the second conflict and were mostly women, the infamous “Black 
Widows”.  
 
Resolution (or lack thereof) 
As violence continued to spiral, the war became a jihad, even if only in name, as figures 
such as Akhmad Kadyrov—Chechnya’s supreme mufti appointed by Dudayev in 1995—officially 
declared jihad and preached for each Chechen to kill at least 150 Russians (Brennan 2004). 
Eventually, the war ended without a clear victor, or so indicated the agreement of a ceasefire in 
Novye Atagi on August 22nd, 1996 between Chechen General Maskhadov and Russian General 
Lebed (Asatiani 2007). This was later formalized on May 12, 1997, known as the Khasavyurt 
accords which contemplated giving compensation to Chechens that had been affected by the war as 
well as other economic concerns (Asatiani 2007). Having achieved a de facto independence, the 
Chechens started their new chapter under General Mashkadov’s leadership as elected president 
(Menon and Fuller 2000, 41). The resulting negative peace for the next 3 years was considered a 
victory for the Chechens and a defeat for the Russians, an association which would characterize the 
Yeltsin period and a heritage from which Putin would do his best to distance himself (Dannreuther 






Second Chechen-Russian War: 1999 - 2009 
The in-between Period 
Just before the Second Chechen-Russian War occurred, Maskhadov’s presidential period 
was filled with destabilization attempts on behalf of Moscow (Menon and Fuller 2000, 41). These 
were mainly carried out by providing support to previous rebels Shamil Basayev and Salman 
Raduyev who became warlords and continued the independentist movement from a revolutionary 
Islamic perspective (Menon and Fuller 2000, 41). However, one particularly useful ally that Putin 
found once he became Prime Minister of Russia in 1999 was none other than Ahkmad Kadyrov, 
who lost his status as supreme mufti in 1999 when he became a Pro-Russian militant and fostered 
great enmity with Maskhadov (Brennan 2004). This became rather apparent as he received official 
support to establish a new capital for a new “interim administration” in the city of Gudermes, while 
Maskhadov held the democratic power in Grozny (Brennan 2004). Putin figured out that the safest 
and most effective way to win over Chechnya was not only to divide and conquer but to actively 
nourish pro-Russian feelings with the help of those warlords that had their own political agendas, 
such as Kadyrov (Dannreuther 2010, 115).  
In 2003, those efforts would bear fruit as the Chechen elections would show 82% of 
approval for Akhmad Kadyrov, who was publicly accused of fraud in allegiance with Moscow, yet 
never faced trial for it (Brennan 2004). While Akhmad Kadyrov was promptly assassinated, his 
successor held office only long enough for his son Ramzan Kadyrov to take over the presidency 
once he reached the legal age of 30 (Markosian and Matloff 2012, 50). This transition was less 
smooth than it could appear as after the assassination of his father, Ramzan did assume the 
leadership and became a warlord for his father’s followers before taking power “officially” in 2006 
(Hauer 2018). This contributed to an increase in violence and lawlessness which was accompanied 
by an almost counterintuitive reconstruction of Chechnya with Moscow’s funds (Steele 2008). 




his pro-Russian and anti-Chechen campaigns much more effective both domestically and 
internationally.  
 
The Conflict and Its Discourses 
Governance difficulties kept on appearing for Maskhadov as bombings on apartment 
buildings in Buynaksk and Volgodonsk between September 4th and 16th, 1999 which left at least 
300 civilians dead (Dannreuther 2010, 114). Moscow was only too quick to thrust the blame upon 
the Chechens even if President Aslan Maskhadov and rebel leaders Shamil Basayev and Emir 
Khattab adamantly denied their involvement (Dannreuther 2010, 115). However, even if the 
masterminds behind the attacks are still a mystery to this day, Putin planted the seed of doubt and 
mistrust in very fertile minds whose national pride had taken several hits. If anything, not only were 
these attacks a starting point for the renewal of the conflict, but their implications brought forward 
one who would become a principal character in Russia’s future: Vladimir Putin. Before the attacks, 
he was the relatively unknown security chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) who in the wake 
of the attacks, got promoted to Prime Minister (Russel 2005, 107). By March 2000, Putin, the 
newly elected president of Russia, decided to fulfill his promise of establishing a 'dictatorship of 
law' (Sawka 2008, 879). With a campaign focused on a zero-tolerance policy and directed towards 
the recovery of Russian identity and pride, Putin’s election marked the start of a new era for Russia. 
Since the aforementioned apartment bombings, Putin would find very easy excuses for the “anti-
terrorist operation” that the government would develop, as this conflict was not portrayed as a 
“war” on the Russian side (Dannreuther 2010, 115).  
Now, on other particulars of the conflict, one definite tactic that became emblematic of the 
Chechen conflict was that of the suicide bombers, an unforeseen technique that would shape the 
Chechen party’s identity into that of a terrorist front that was absent and actively avoided during the 




involvement of women in a rather sexist context (Reuter 2004, 26). Increasingly negative attention 
was garnered by the “Black Widows”, female suicide bombers that started their lethal modus 
operandi (MO) in 2000 (Jamali 2017). Regardless of the rather sexist practices and increasingly 
controlling policies of the Kadyrov regimes instituted based on Sharia law (Markosian and Matloff 
2012, 50), the Black Widows took a front role in the terror activities of the warlords and 
Wahhabists’ jihad. Eventually, this MO would lend itself to draw parallels with the War on Terror 
waged in the Middle East by 2002 (Russell 2005, 112). The ever-spreading suicide attacks allowed 
the government to formally change the “issue of Chechnya” for the “situation of the North 
Caucasus” (Dannreuther 2010, 115), even if the political measures to solve it involved military 
actions almost solely around Chechnya (Snetkov 2007, 1358). Understandably, this could appear 
contradictory, and that is because it is. As previously mentioned, most of the rest of the North 
Caucasus was not Muslim and the little Muslim presence over the area was due to the previous 
forced exile and small refugee settlements of those who fled the first conflict (Russell 2005, 103-
104). To better understand this, bear in mind the declarations of the Russian Justice Minister, Yuri 
Tchaika who referring to the conflict in 2004 as an: “invisible threat without borders” (Translated in 
Snetkov 2007, 1353). That phrase condenses one of the key arguments that the Russian authorities 
used in their discourse to justify their counter-terrorism operation to prevent the “infection” of 
radical Islam to spread throughout the Caucasus.  
As explained above, suicide bombing was a new technique for an old conflict and it 
accounted for most of the panic that civilians reported in surveys (Snetkov 2007, 1353; Russell 
2005, 112). Simultaneously, news coverage repeatedly informed about increasing suicide attacks, 
conveniently leaving out that most targets had been military settlements or government facilities 
with little-to-none civilian presence (Reuter 2004, 36). Nevertheless, the Chechen party still 
resorted to their tried and true method, hostage-taking, to drive their demands across albeit with 




the two biggest crises during this conflict: the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre siege in 2002 and the 
Beslan School siege in 2004 which were both hostage situations not unlike the Budyonnovsk and 
Kyzlar events but with entirely different perceptions from the Russian and international public.  
 
Hostage Situations 
On the one hand, the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre siege could be considered another 
example of a Pyrrhic victory, however this time favoring the Russians. On October 23rd, 2002, 979 
people were turned into hostages as 53 armed men and women would seize control of the place for 
the next 58 hours (Snetkov 2007, 1352). Like previous hostage situations negotiated between 
Russians and Chechens, Dubrovka had an exorbitant number of casualties as 128 hostages died by 
poisoning due to the rescue mission on October 26th (Snetkov 2007, 1352). While no party came 
through clean-handed, the Russian party defended its actions as sufficient and appropriate for the 
threat even if some evidence shows that careful planning could have reduced the casualties with 
minimum effort. One would argue that the significance of the attack derived not only of the tragedy 
and mourning that such a number of casualties stirred in the Russian people, but rather because it 
was performed in the heart of Russia, not unlike 9/11 taking away a distinctive symbol from the 
US. In a fashion akin to 9/11, the press, which had become strictly regulated, kept the event on 
everyone’s mind all the time (Snetkov 2007, 1358). These actions served to elicit rage and promote 
sensations of otherness from the Russians to the Chechens, but also contributed to desensitize the 
population to the measures that would be taken in retaliation.  
On the other hand, the Beslan School siege adds other elements to the analysis of the 
hostage situation. On September 1st, 2004 the new school year inauguration ceremony was 
interrupted by 38 armed people who took 1200 hostages at once and mined the building (Snetkov 
2007, 1352). And, if Dubrovka had enraged the Russian population, Beslan squeezed and tore at 




which half of them were children, and 200 people were missing not to mention the hundreds 
wounded (Snetkov 2007, 1352). Beslan differs from Dubrovka not only because it happened in a 
small and far-off town, but also because it involved a large number of children which was 
unsettling even before there was a death count. Not only had the Chechens lost most of the 
empathy, or even disinterest that the Russian population had for them, these terrorist acts of such a 
large magnitude only worsened the international image that they used to have. This further 
contributed to the notions of otherness, dehumanization and even demonization to which Chechens 
were being subjected, a phenomenon which went as far as to create the term “Caucasophobia” 
(Hawkes 2011; Russell 2005, 112), exemplified by this extract of the Moscow News: 
Most city residents of peasant origin in Russia blame Jews or "Caucasians" (people who 
come from the Caucasus) for all their woes. Despite the fact that Caucasians (being 
Caucasians) are largely white-skinned, common Russians call them blacks or black asses. 
Police officials have even come up with a term "a person of Caucasian nationality". 
(Russell 2005, 105-106) 
 
Resolution 
While the “official” end of the conflict was announced on April 16th, 2009, the direct 
confrontations had already mostly ceased by 2007 (Schwirtz 2009). However, it should be noted 
that since this conflict was not outright recognized as a war, but rather an antiterrorism mission by 
the Russian state, it was not until a document had been issued to conclude the operation that the 
decade-long confrontation had a semblance of closure. Nevertheless, President Ramzan Kadyrov 
had been instructed since 2007 to take charge of the reconstruction of Chechnya, particularly, 
Grozny (Schwirtz 2009). In an impressive turn of events, not two years after the informal ceasefire, 
Grozny could not look any more different from its wartime appearance. Nonetheless, regardless of 
this healthy and thriving image with international brands and businesses working (Steele 2008), 
Chechens had not yet healed and some causes of the clash were still present, such as poverty and 





As if that were not enough, while the Kremlin’s sponsoring of Kadyrov had been a well-
known “secret”, the reconstruction processes funding that came from the centralized government 
quieted some of the critics (Steele 2008). It should be mentioned that the funds came only after 
Russia started to participate in the oil market, coincidentally the very same resource that is rather 
abundant in the Chechen territory to which Moscow had finally gained access (Steele 2008). Some 
of the “moderate” Chechens that supported Kadyrov considered his change of allegiance as a 
strategy to get resources for their own troops on Moscow’s penny and that another Chechen 
uprising would take place (Steele 2008). However, a decade has passed since then and Kadyrov is 
just as -if not more- comfortable than he used to be, taking liberties because of his relative 
importance to the Russian officialist regime as well as to the Chechens themselves 
(RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 2008). Kadyrov’s identity is conflictive because while plenty 
consider him a traitor because of his political allegiances and radical policies (Markosian and 
Matloff 2012, 50) several others would begrudgingly admit that thanks to his actions the war came 
to an eventual end, not counting the rising aggressions that would come in the next decade as 
Kadyrov became too comfortable with his power and his death squad, the Kadyrovsty (Walker 
2019, Kalyapin and Reiter 2011). The words of political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky help to 
understand his standing both in relation to Russia and Chechenia: “For years, Vladimir Putin saw 
the pacification of Chechnya as his main achievement, (…) In that respect, Putin has a colossal 
psychological dependency on Chechnya and Ramzan Kadyrov who ensured the pacification" (in 





Similarities and Differences Between the Two Conflicts 
As both conflicts have been briefly described, comparisons and contrasts will be drawn in 
relation to the nature of the conflicts, the notions of sovereignty, the role of the media and the 
effects of 9/11. The comparisons will be made as they relate to actors involved, actions taken or 
content of discourses. Attention will be drawn towards whether it was the discourse or the context 
that changed and shaped the transformations of the Chechens. The reader should be aware that 
several of the quotes included are translations because the original material was in Russian, hence 
some of the context could get lost in translation. However, when possible, further insight into the 
Russian and Chechen ideologies will be given. It is also noted that because of the differences in 
duration of the conflicts, some of the information for the second conflict might experience its own 
transformation.  
 
Nature of the Conflicts 
The first comparison entails how the conflicts themselves are understood and even named. 
On the one hand, the first conflict (1994-1996) has been described as an ethnonational conflict that 
took place in the Russian region of Chechnya and was in fact recognized as a war, albeit of a civil 
nature. On the other hand, the second conflict (1999-2009) was described as a religious conflict 
associated with a global jihad and terrorism that took place in the North Caucasus and was officially 
known as an “antiterrorism operation” rather than a war, at least by the Russian Federation. These 
particulars allowed for different interpretations to be made, first of all, because a war gives a notion 
of two Parties who could be in the right or wrong while an “operation” has a principal actor 
complying with those orders with a receiving/reacting party which is less legitimate. In this case, 
while the first conflict had a David v. Goliath kind of narrative, the second case had a good v. evil 
model. This was a key difference that allowed for different interpretations and reception both by 




support to the mid-90s “freedom fighters” in the face of the fear and rage against the 2000s “Islamic 
terrorists” (Russell 2005, 102). In the war between two unmatched parties, people readily supported 
the cause of the underdog and showed empathy to the Chechens, feelings which were lost and 
replaced by demands of justice and retribution to the ‘evil terrorists’ of the second conflict even if 
their actions like hostage-taking, bombings and military ambushes were mostly the same in both 
scenarios.  
In addition, while the ethnonational denomination conveys a domestic interpretation of a 
conflict by which separatism could pose a threat to a State’s stability, the jihad label of the second 
conflict allowed for it to be enlarged to cover the area of the Northern Caucasus and inserting it in 
the global War on Terror. So, while President Yeltsin was encouraged to approach and negotiate 
with President Dudayev and strongly criticized for not doing so in 1994 (Muratov 2014), most of 
Putin’s decisions went unquestioned (Dannreuther 2010, 115). This could be explained by 
understanding that while Yeltsin’s actions concerned his own citizens (reluctant to be so, or not), 
Putin’s counterpart was a threatening non-state actor, hence the differences in the acceptance they 
received for their courses of action. Such is the case that while Yeltsin tried to defend himself by 
declarations such as “Dudayev’d never pick up [the phone]” (Muratov 2014) Putin could excuse his 
actions by minimizing the Chechens’ power of decision by stating that “Chechens are only their 
errand boys” (quoted in Snetkov 2007, 1353) and reaffirming that Russia “does not negotiate with 
terrorists” (quoted in Dannreuther 2010, 116). In that way, the responsibility for negotiation and 
peace, as well as the allowance for the use of power, was radically different in both cases. And, as 
the second conflict progressed, in 2002 Putin went as far as to say: “they [the terrorists] and those 
who stand behind them, are precisely scared of the future ... stabilisation in the Chechen republic” 
(quoted in Snetkov 2007, 1356) claiming that he cared about the wellbeing of the people of the 
North Caucasus without explicitly mentioning the Chechens, starting to transform the “Chechen 





On Sovereignty and the State 
Russia went through various accelerated and massive changes after the dismantling of the 
USSR, hence issues like sovereignty were rather malleable and delicate and experienced several 
transformations before consolidating. Now, recalling the start of Yeltsin’s period with the new 
Russian Federation there is one particular quote of his that could act as the first nail in his own 
coffin when on August 6th, 1990, he addressed regional leaders and encouraged them to: “Help 
yourself to as much sovereignty as you can swallow” (Muratov 2014). That started a process 
referred to by Gorbachev as “the parade of sovereignties” (Muratov 2014). However, not everyone 
was allowed to participate in that parade, as the Chechen case shows. The conditions of abundance 
of oil in the Caucasus prevented the recognition of the Caucasus’ independence because of 
Yeltsin’s decision to structure the state in favor of Russian elites while trying to become 
competitive in a global market economy (Sakwa 2008, 880) for which oil was an invaluable asset. 
Yeltsin made the mistake of offering something he was not going to provide and consequently 
weakened his credibility and power over the territories that had already organized themselves apart 
from Russia. Hence, the de facto independence achieved by the Chechens after the first war was 
taken as the closest thing to that promised sovereignty. 
Now, while Putin received that model from Yeltsin and did not change it much, he 
presented a strong case for the need of a “sovereign democracy” (Dannreuther 2010, 123), a need to 
rescue the integrity of the state (Sakwa 2008, 881) and the strategic creation of the 
“Chechenization” proposal to bring peace to Chechnya (Dannreuther 2010, 116). These efforts by 
Putin painted the efforts in Chechnya in a different light, that of preventing a state to be further 
broken and separated. This can be seen in 2002 after the attacks when he expressed that: “of course 
one of the main aims of the terrorists was to humiliate Russia. Those who were involved in the 




1358). He defended the notion of Chechens belonging to Russian identity without claiming that 
they were Russian themselves. Thus, he attempted to invisibilize the distinction of identities with 
the “good Chechens” like Kadyrov who allied with the central government interests and creating 
otherness in the “bad Chechens” who wanted independence. Now, under the Kadyrov regime, 
Chechnya has a different -and debatable- sort of liberty, that of federal authority over their territory 
which while more “legitimate” than the de facto independence with Yeltsin, is also more limited 
and regulated in the best of cases.  
 
Access of the Media to the Conflicts 
This section relates in particular to the information available during both periods, which can 
be better exemplified by focusing on the respective hostage crises of each conflict. During the first 
conflict, one notices the abundance of information that eventually becomes unreliable 
approximations of figures for the number of Chechens present and their hostages. In the second 
conflict, that is almost non-existent. Take, for example, how in the Budyonnovsk hostage situation 
the figures presented were that the hostages were around 1,000 and the rebels were 100 and in 
Kizlyar around 3,000 hostages and 200 Chechen militants (BBC News 2004). The author chose 
these estimates because they seemed to be averaged from several other sources. The research turned 
up government-controlled media which tried to either reduce the number of hostages and rebels 
(especially when the death toll was reported) or increase the number of arrests and killings of the 
Chechens while reducing the number of those who escaped. On other private Western media such 
as the New York Times, the Guardian or the Independent the figures changed by dozens and 
sometimes hundreds, giving a sense of confusion rather than reliable information. During the 
second hostage crisis, the Dubrovka Theatre would report 979 hostages and 53 armed Chechen men 
and women together with 128 civilian casualties with Beslan reporting 38 Chechens and 1200 




articles -both academic and news- agreed on those numbers was that they were the ones available 
and provided by the authorities.  
A lesson learnt by Putin from Yeltsin’s experience was that of the importance of controlling 
access to information. Yeltsin worsened his credibility by accusing Dudayev of being inaccessible 
while journalists managed to easily talk to him on the phone (Muratov 2014) and not regulating the 
presence of journalists on the battlefields (Russell 2005, 105). His efforts proved counterproductive 
as while he denied interviews with both local and international media, his counterpart Dudayev and 
other Chechen leaders were accommodating and open (105-106) resulting in good reviews, 
favorable reporting and widespread sympathy and empathy for the underdog that they represented. 
It was especially important when Yeltsin decided to demonize Chechens in the national media 
accusing them as “bandits” and “terrorists” while also referring dismissively to them as “wolves” 
(stereotypical Russian slur for Caucasians, especially Chechens) (106). To his dismay, the 
Chechens embraced that attempt to dismiss them to the extent that:  
The Chechens adopted the wolf as their national symbol; it featured on the flag of 
independent Chechnya - Ichkeria and figured in the first line of their national anthem. A 
Chechen fighter was proud to be called a borz (wolf) and strove to uphold the spiritual 
affinity between the abrek [lone outlaw that resisted Russian rule] and the courageous, lone 
wolf silhouetted against the moon. (106) 
 
In contrast, Putin acted strategically about the press and the media, for one, making it 
almost impossible for international correspondents to get to Russia much less to Chechnya and by 
controlling the local news media (Snetkov 2007, 1349-1350). Now, the next step had been to 
institutionalize the use of “terrorists” as the main—and practically sole—acceptable denomination 
for all activities by the Chechens (1360-1361). In addition, access to international media was 
restricted to most of the Russian population and the local media was in charge of showing 
authorized and mandatory content that insisted on the violent, aggressive and even savage nature 




(1359) not unlike the 9/11 coverage by the media. Yeltsin’s previous efforts suited Putin well 
enough as: 
The wolf, however, figures large in the Russian imagination (...). Perceived to be a 
fearsome, cunning, fierce and untameable opponent, for the Russians the wolf came to 
symbolise the Chechen, a worthy enemy, but one that was wild and dangerous enough to 
warrant only destruction. Lupine epithets were given to the Chechen leaders: Aslan 
Maskhadov (President of Chechnya-Ichkeria from 1997) 'the wolf with a human face', 
Shamil Basayev 'the lone wolf and Salman Raduyev-'the loony wolf. (Russell 2005, 106)  
 
 
The Effects of 9/11 and Islamic Radicalization 
On the one hand, Islamic radicalization was not a concern during Yeltsin’s presidential 
period in the sense of a global threat. Even more, it was Yeltsin’s reforms which allowed for Islam 
to reflourish in Russia and the Caucasus (Dannreuther 2010, 212) and during Dudayev’s rule, 
independence was conceived to become a secular state (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2008, 1209). 
While there was some evidence of Wahabbist’s presence during the 1994-1996 war, such was 
mostly under the rule of certain warlords rather than a generalized approach (Jamali 2017). On the 
other hand, Bush’s War on Terrorism would introduce radical Islam as a worldwide problem. 
Unbeknownst to Putin, his claims in 1999 of being the first front to “a vital link in the fight against 
terrorism and in the protection of the Western civilization” (in Snetkov 2007, 1361) would 
eventually become validated within that global discourse. The renewal of aggression in 1999 helped 
Putin get to power aiding his presidential campaign for 2000, as he promised different and stronger 
management of the “Chechen issue” in contrast to the shameful and unsatisfactory performance of 
Yeltsin. Nevertheless, such is the case that even if included in his presidential campaign proposals, 
starting in 2002 the “Chechen issue” became actively removed from the political agenda by 2004 
both domestically and internationally as will be further explained.  
After the 9/11 attacks, Putin was quick to express the following: “What happened today 




fight against terrorism. That is the plague of the twenty-first century. Russia directly knows what 
terrorism is and for that reason we understand the feelings of the American people” (Quoted in 
Snetkov 2007, 1351) Putin seized the chance to validate the traumatic experiences of one of its 
previous most critical allies, the United States. Together with Bush, they were able to justify 
military actions that would have not been approved of if the global atmosphere of fear had not been 
there. As Putin was able to define his course of action as a counterterrorist operation, “The military 
were given carte blanche to conduct the war in whatever way was necessary to bring decisive 
victory” (Dannreuther 2010,115). It is because of this exception kind of mentality, that the abuses 
that took place were allowed since he had learnt from the previous conflict that a guerilla war was 
not to be confronted as a state’s strategy and thus created gray areas to justify a new kind of war 
(119).  
For a while, Russia had the United States’ support evidenced by its provision of weaponry 
to “submit” the terrorists (Souleimanov y Ditrych, 2008, 1202) as well as intelligence such as that 
provided by the US State Department about Middle East countries funding the Chechens with at 
least $1000 million USD in the early 2000s (1206). However, as the conflict progressed, Russia 
parted from the US discourse and centered on managing the situation by the aforementioned use of 
“moderate” Chechen leaders who they could buy into compliance such as the Kadyrovs and more 
or less give the illusion of democratic institutions and fragile peace (Harding 2009). This is better 
expressed as follows: "It would be difficult to describe Chechnya as peaceful. But Kadyrov has 
achieved 'stability' in the Russian and Chechen definition of the word," (Sergei Markedonov quoted 
in Harding 2009). This arrangement was even more beneficial as it allowed Russia access to the 
Chechen oil and this profit was used to further elaborate the scheme of a pacified Russia.  
To conclude, the similarities between the conflicts surpass the differences that can be found. 
Arguably, the most significant change was in the religious discourse which went from being used 




War on Terror made it possible to legitimize Putin’s claims and turn the tides against the Chechens. 
The other defining factor was the role of the media to allow for the Chechens to be heard, rather 
than to be relegated to a silence under the power relation stablished by a dominant Russia. This can 
be seen as, apart from the introduction of the Black Widows, the Chechens MO of guerilla war 
tactics and hostage-taking was mostly the same on both circumstances. However, because of an 
unforeseeable history-changing event such as 9/11, a new global discourse was constructed and 
thus allowed for the discursive manipulation of the Chechen’s identity while the absence and 









The first and second Chechen wars murdered Russian democracy in its cradle, for when the 
cannons sing the people thirst for blood and opponents of government become traitors to 
the nation; elections lose their meaning and parliament ceases to be a place for discussion.  
 
- Dmitry Muratov, “The Chechen wars murdered Russian democracy in its cradle” 
 
  
As one of the few Russian journalists that tried to provide reliable and unbiased information 
throughout the conflicts, Muratov’s quote resonates as it implies that the price Russia paid was the 
loss of the main aspiration after the downfall of the USSR, democracy itself. It suggests that the 
nascent-Russian state had its own desire for democracy and freedom that was not achieved whether 
due to corrupt inadequate leaders who led them to war or the fragility of a state that broke itself 
apart for keeping too strong of a grip on its past. What this quote exemplifies is that even the 
winning side faces losses and makes sacrifices, which is why both conflicts could be considered 
Pyrrhic victories both for Chechnya and Russia, respectively. While one never achieved their true 
independence, the other one relinquished the opportunity to create its own identity rather than try to 
stick to one of its predecessors, namely, the Russian empire and its domination of the Caucasus. 
The main conclusion drawn is that discourse is a powerful tool that all actors use and 
contribute to perpetuate and/or modify power relations. However, regardless of the fact that all 
parties participate in the creation of discourses, their relative power, legitimacy, and context will 
affect how they are perceived. Especially now, in a highly technological world where information 
technologies allow for the spread of instant data and the possibility to know about things happening 
all around the world in real-time, a key concern is no longer the lack of information but the 
overabundance of not entirely reliable information. Readers, be them academic or not, need to be 
aware of the implications of vocabulary and language choices around them and how they shape 




Additionally, in a world that keeps such a fast pace, another challenge is that of consistency. 
In the case of the Chechen-Russian conflicts, it seemed uncanny how a topic that used to be so 
representative because of its presence on the news media and even on the entertainment business 
could suddenly be abandoned and replaced by “the next big thing”, namely, 9/11. Political action 
should be concerned with the ways in which memory and attention affect mobilization, support and 
provide legitimacy to political movements around the world. Young generations that grew up in 
this era of information need to find a way to work out how they can use their tools and advantages 
for the future without letting the past fade away. The risk of this unconscious consumption of 
information being that people become desensitized to the happenings around the world and do not 
realize that things happening on the other side of the world have very real consequences on 
domestic issues.  
Finally, Chechnya’s experience can be seen as a large-scale case of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that derives from the power of discourse. On the one hand, it involves the analysis that as 
long as actors have a voice and are able to participate in a narrative, they are capable of shaping 
their identities more fully. On the other hand, it shows how being subjected to the discourse of 
another that builds an alternative -and negative- identity does not only affect the perception of the 
“external” receptors of that discourse, but it may even affect the involved Party’s identity and 
reshape it to fulfill the discourse. This observation comes from the power of the language in 
creating expectations whether of the other’s behavior or nature, be it that of a defensive or an 
aggressive behavior or that of “rational and human” nature in contrast to an “irrational and savage” 
nature which were part of both of the Chechens identity respectively. The suppression of their voice 
from the narrative allowed for them to be deindividualized, dehumanized, and, ultimately, 
demonized. Not only was that the Russian and international perception of the Chechens, but it also 
started to shape their own identity perception when they started normalizing terrorist-like behavior 




even if briefly and to their detriment in the long term. The power of discourse can be seen as bigger 
than those that wield it and for that reason, more attention and critical thinking is necessary by both 
the general public and academia to understand and decode the information that is not only available, 
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